← Jessica Xu

MSc dissertation · UCL Digital Humanities · 2026

You met me at a very Chinese time in my life

Animated beaver with a bandaged face

Labubu charms hang from handbags. Chinese dramas travel across streaming platforms. Xiaohongshu became a destination for some TikTok users when the U.S. threatened a ban. China now appears in Western life not only as a political rival, but as a source of trends, humour and things people enjoy.

That feels striking after the first years of Covid, when China was discussed through the pandemic: where the virus came from, how the government responded, and what lockdown looked like. Stories of people sealed into buildings sat alongside reporting on censorship and the treatment of Uyghurs. China became shorthand for state control and the dangers of giving government too much power.

That picture has not disappeared, but now it has company. When some TikTok users moved to Xiaohongshu, the exchange was comic and unexpectedly personal. Chinese users welcomed their new visitors; Americans joked about becoming spies and compared notes on healthcare. For a moment, people met one another as people, rather than as symbols of rival countries.

I don’t think this interest was designed by one person or committee. The Chinese state has spent years trying to shape how China is seen abroad, but this new attention travels through users, trends and jokes. Someone might arrive for a product, a city or a drama without making any political statement. Still, that familiarity can change what comparisons feel possible. I wanted to see how this complicated shift appeared in the words people use.

There is a wider shift in polling, too. Pew found that China was viewed more positively than the United States in 25 of the 37 countries it surveyed. In the U.S., the share of adults with a favourable view of China rose from 14% in 2023 to 21% in 2025. That is not the same as what people post online, but it gives this cultural moment a broader context.

I expected the warmer mood around Chinese culture to show up as a broad turn towards positive views. It doesn’t. In these Reddit communities, discussion about China became less negative, but the overall score stayed below zero. China-focused communities grew more positive by 2025; news and politics remained negative. The lines below put those different measures side by side. They move in a related period, but they do not measure the same thing.

Reddit stance and U.S. views of China

January 2020 to December 2025.

REDDIT EXPECTED STANCEU.S. FAVOURABLE VIEWS (%)−0.06−0.14−0.223020102020: 19% of U.S. adults favourable toward China2021: 21% of U.S. adults favourable toward China2022: 16% of U.S. adults favourable toward China2023: 14% of U.S. adults favourable toward China2024: 16% of U.S. adults favourable toward China2025: 21% of U.S. adults favourable toward China202020212022202320242025
Reddit target-weighted stance · monthlyPew U.S. poll · favourable toward China
Reddit stance is monthly; Pew’s U.S. favourability measure is annual.

The Reddit sample covers ten English-language communities, each with its own reason for talking about China. I read the poll as context for the online conversation, not as a prediction of what Reddit would say.

Admiring a film or learning Mandarin is not the same as approving of the government. In the data, culture and media draw more positive discussion; the government and CCP draw much more negative discussion. People and identity sit closer to the middle. A single score for “China” would mash those reactions together.

What are people actually responding to?
0.10.0-0.2-0.4202020212022202320242025China generallyGovernment / CCPPeople / identityCulture / mediaCompanies / technology
China generallyGovernment / CCPPeople / identityCulture / mediaCompanies / technology
Annual expected stance by target, 2020–2025.

You can see why context matters in r/ChineseLanguage: its slightly positive score mostly reflects people learning a language, not a community full of endorsements of China.

The rise is not just because more China-friendly communities joined the conversation. When I compare the same kinds of subreddits, subjects and posts, nearly three quarters of the shift comes from within those groups. The changing mix matters too, but it is not the whole story.

The 2020–2025 change, split in two
0+0.086Within comparable groups: +0.0642, 74.5%Changing mix: +0.0220, 25.5%+0.064 within (74.5%)+0.022 mix (25.5%)
Grouping by subreddit, content type and target: 25.5% composition; 74.5% within-group change.

To me, that looks less like a new set of voices drowning out the old ones and more like familiar spaces becoming less negative. It doesn’t explain why. And the split changes with the comparison: using subreddit alone, community mix accounts for 41% of the rise.

Reddit stance, up close

Scroll over the graph to zoom around a date. Zoomed out, both lines smooth across years; zoomed in, they show monthly stance and post volume. Click an event mark to see its date and details.

YEARLY AVERAGESPOSTS + COMMENTS / MONTH-0.08-0.14-0.200k15k30k2020-01-31: US travel ban on China (COVID)2020-04-01: US intelligence: China concealed outbreak2020-05-28: Hong Kong security law approved (NPC)2020-06-30: G4 swine-flu 'pandemic potential' (+ HK law enacted)2020-07-22: Uighur/Xinjiang legal-pressure calls (+ consulate closure)2020-09-08: Mulan-Xinjiang filming boycott2020-12-16: UK: Xinjiang forced-labor evidence2021-06-04: Tiananmen anniversary2022-08-02: Pelosi lands in Taiwan2023-02-04: Spy balloon shot down2025-04-09: US-China tariff escalation202020212022202320242025

Yearly averages · 72 months · about 12,605 posts and comments per month · 11 event markers

Expected stance · left axisReddit posts + comments · right axis
Selected Reddit records (posts and comments) per month: 21,847 in January 2020 and 8,434 in December 2025.

Even the tone of a post is not the same as its opinion. Sarcasm, jokes and praise for one part of China can sit beside criticism of another. The next graph compares a word-tone score with the stance model on the same records. They broadly move together over the full period, but can diverge sharply month to month—and sometimes disagree about whether a target is positive or negative at all.

Stance vs. Sentiment

VADER picks up the tone of the words. The stance model asks what the speaker thinks about China.

MONTHLY SCORES · 2020–20250.20.10.0-0.1-0.2202020212022202320242025

72 months in view

VADER toneTarget-specific stance

The two lines share a broad direction (Spearman’s correlation is 0.842), but month-to-month changes line up much less (0.371). They answer different questions. VADER scores the emotional tone of a record once; even with the same records and weights, it cannot tell which target the wording praises or criticises. A mildly worded criticism can sound neutral, while a warm recommendation of a film can lift the tone score without taking a position on China itself. That makes VADER the less rigorous measure for my question—what position does a comment take towards a specific target?—though it is still useful for tracking the mood of the language. The difference is stark for government/CCP: VADER averages −0.035, while target-specific stance averages −0.351. For culture/media, VADER is +0.212 and stance +0.077. My stance model is a closer fit because it identifies the target before estimating positive, negative or no directed stance; it is still a model-based estimate, not ground truth.

VADER lexical tone and expected stance, matched monthly scores for China generally, 2020–2025.
VADER, 2015–2025

The earlier series continues through the 2025 data cutoff.

MONTHLY VADER COMPOUND SCORE · 2015–20250.100.00-0.0520152016201720182019202020212022202320242025
Monthly VADER compound score across China-related posts, 2015–2025.

I don’t think people are suddenly deciding they want one-party rule. I think confidence in the Western model has worn thin. Democracy was sold as a route to prosperity, security and a say in how things are run. When daily life feels more expensive and less stable, that promise is harder to believe. Images of Chinese infrastructure and long-term planning then become more than impressive skylines: they become an argument about what a government can get done.

That argument leaves out a great deal. A lively feed cannot tell us how content an entire population is, just as a skyline cannot show what was lost to build it. China's system can pursue long-term projects, but it also concentrates power and restricts dissent. I’m not arguing that the West should copy it. I’m interested in why the comparison has become tempting, and what it reveals about the things people feel their own governments no longer provide. Maybe the useful question is not which system wins, but how to build a political system that can deliver security and a sense of possibility without asking people to give up their freedom.

Pew’s U.S. figures are from its 2026 report on views of China.

Sentiment analysis · Finetuning · ModernBERT · VADER · Python · R

London, UK